## For the Northern District of California

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1		
2	2	
3	3	
4	1	
5	5	
6	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
7		
8	FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
9	WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,	
10	Plaintiff, No. C 11-03267 JSW	
11	v.	
12		AND
13	VACATING CASE B Defendant.  MANAGEMENT CONFERI	ENCE
14	4	

This matter appears for a case management conference set for February 24, 2012. Neither party has submitted a case management statement. Federal courts have a duty to raise and decide issues of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte at any time it appears subject matter jurisdiction may be lacking. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12; Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983). It appears that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this matter.

On March 14, 2011, Plaintiff filed a complaint for unlawful detainer in San Francisco County Superior Court against Defendant Teresita D. Sulit (the "State Court action"). (See Notice of Removal.) On July 1, 2011, Defendant Sulit removed the State Court action on the basis that jurisdiction is premised upon a federal question. (See id.) "[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant ... to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending." Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1983) (citation omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1441.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

However, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Accordingly, the burden of
establishing federal jurisdiction for purposes of removal is on the party seeking removal, and
the removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co.
372 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir.
1992). "Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in
the first instance." Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566.

"The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the 'wellpleaded complaint rule." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 382, 392 (1987). The wellpleaded complaint rule recognizes that the plaintiff is the master of his or her claim. "[H]e or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law." *Id.* Thus, under the well-pleaded complaint rule, federal-question jurisdiction arises where the "complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law." Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983).

The State Court action is an unlawful detainer action and, thus, federal law does not create the cause of action. Moreover, the Court finds that the claim will not necessarily depend upon the resolution of a substantial question of federal law, because Plaintiff need not prove compliance with the federal law relied upon by Defendant to establish its claim. See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng. & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314-15 (2005).

Furthermore, a court cannot exercise removal jurisdiction on the ground that the complaint gives rise to a potential or an anticipated *defense* that might raise a federal question, even if the defense is the only question truly at issue in the case. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 10, 14; see also Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393 ("[I]t is now settled law that a case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense, including the defense of preemption, even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff's complaint, and even if both parties concede that the federal defense is the only question truly at issue.") (emphasis in original). Therefore, the Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear this matter

as currently pled and must remand to the state court. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); *see also Maniar* v. *FDIC*, 979 F.2d 782, 785 (9th Cir. 1992).

In addition, Defendant also failed to remove within thirty days of being served with the complaint which serves as a bar to federal jurisdiction. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1446 ("[t]he notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within thirty days, by the receipt of the Defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief").

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ISSUES this order to show cause to Defendant to respond in writing by no later than **March 9, 2012** why this case should not be remanded to the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of San Francisco. Should Defendant fail to respond, this case shall be remanded for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court also VACATES the case management conference set for February 24, 2012 at 1:30 p.m.

## IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 22, 2012

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

You Historia

27

28

## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 2 FOR THE 3 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 4 5 WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. et al, Case Number: CV11-03267 JSW 6 Plaintiff, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 7 v. 8 SULIT et al, 9 Defendant. 10 11 I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court, Northern District of California. That on February 22, 2012, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office. 15 16 Teresita D. Sulit 101 University Street 17 San Francisco, CA 94134 with Ottole 18 Dated: February 22, 2012 W. Wieking, Clerk 19 By: Jennifer Ottolini, Deputy Clerk 20 21 22 23 24 25 26